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I. Introduction
Corporate financial scandals have left investors worried, wondering if 
corporations around the world have misused their hard earned money. There 
were calls for a better system of corporate governance to prevent corporations 
from misusing shareholder funds through questionable practices. Corporations 
in Asia were accused of committing gross excesses in their borrowing and 
investments, fueling speculative real estate bubbles. In some cases, large 
controlling shareholders were alleged to have siphoned corporate wealth to the 
detriment of the corporation, minority shareholders and creditors.(1)  
Governments around the world reacted to these financial scandals to 
reassure investors that there would be improvements in the way corporations are 
managed and regulated.(2) In a bid to assuage investor’s fears, a plethora of codes 
of best governance practices and laws were introduced, aimed at improving 
transparency and accountability, along with stricter enforcement of rules. 
Malaysia too, introduced a code on corporate governance, established a minority 
shareholder watchdog group and mandated  continuing education program for 
board directors. 
1. Research motivation
This paper is written against a background of corporate collapse and 
regional financial turmoil in 1997 and the measures taken to strengthen 
corporate governance structures.  It explores two key elements: The ownership 
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structure and corporate governance mechanisms, in particular internal corporate 
governance mechanisms. Investigating the link between them is premised on the 
possibility that internal governance mechanism will be arranged in response to 
regulatory requirements but without weakening the position of the controlling 
shareholders in decision making in the company. Accordingly the question that 
helps to shape and focus the discussion is “How do ownership characteristics 
affect internal corporate governance mechanisms?” 
2. Research framework
The research framework is largely based on the Agency Theory. In large 
listed firms, ownership is dispersed and managers effectively control the 
firm. These dispersed shareholders who are de jure owners of the corporation 
generally do not monitor the performance of the managers because of the free-
rider problem, a situation that arises because each individual shareholder holds 
such a small share of the corporation that he would not invest the time and 
money to monitor management decisions. Managers become the agents of these 
widely dispersed owners (principals).  
Managers as agents have de facto control with respect to decisions regarding 
the use of corporate assets and the strategic direction of the corporation. With 
this control, Managers (agents) are more likely to make decisions that serve 
management interest rather than that of the owners (principals). The self-serving 
behavior of the manager is the Agency Cost that is borne by all shareholders. 
The problems arising from this separation, and the mechanisms to address these 
problems are the essence of most discussions on corporate governance. 
Berle and Means, in their influential work, discuss the separation between 
ownership and control as “the owners without appreciable control and control 
without appreciable ownership”.(3) With dispersed ownership, the managers’ 
control of the firm became entrenched. Jensen and Meckling formalized the 
concept as a problem that arises between an agent (manager) and the principal 
(shareholders).(4) Adam Smith, much earlier highlighted the problem of entrusting 
one’s money to another when he wrote that managers of other peoples money 
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cannot be expected to watch over it with the same anxious vigilance, one would 
expect from owners and that “negligence and profusion, therefore must always 
prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.”(5)
Despite Berle and Means’ description of a dispersed shareholders in modern 
corporations, ,La Porta et al documented the shareholding in 27 richest countries 
and found that 64 percent of large firms have controlling shareholders.(6) In East 
Asia, 75% of the listed companies have owners controlling 50% or more of the 
shares.(7) 
A study of the top 100 companies in Malaysia during the period 1974-1977 
showed that the top 5 per cent of shareholders owned 63.03 percent of shares 
and the top 10 percent held 75.73 percent of the shares.(8) Recent studies, 
indicate that pyramidal structure of ownership remains common.(9) This pattern 
of concentrated corporate ownership is still evident. A World Bank study found 
family control in 67 per cent of listed Malaysian companies. Large controlling 
shareholder raises corporate governance issues.(10) 
The preponderance of majority-controlled firms may be due to a number 
of factors. There is a strong need to maintain control of a firm within a family. 
Even though a firm expands in size and operation, and the family seeks external 
equity, control is still exercised through nominee and pyramidal structures. With 
substantial ownership stakes, large owners have the incentive and ability to 
monitor managers.(11)
Concentrated ownership is not without risk. The investment is un-diversified 
and subject to non-systemic risk. There is a tradeoff in the private benefits of 
control and the risk of having un-diversified shareholding. The existence of the 
widespread use of pyramid structures to maintain control and other evidence 
suggest that the benefits of concentrated holding may exceed the cost.
In Malaysia, the rise of state and state-linked corporate ownership can be 
traced to the imbalanced in ownership patterns prior to 1970, where ownership 
patterns were concentrated and skewed towards foreigners and ethnic Chinese. 
Whereas, corporate ownership by the majority of the population, namely 
the Malays and other indigenous peoples, henceforth collectively referred 
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to as Bumiputra amounted to only about 1.5 percent.(12)  As a result, the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) was formulated in 1970 to provide a framework for 
development planning, specifically to address social and economic disparities 
in the country and increase Bumiputra participation in the economy. As a result, 
the involvement of state and state-linked organization in commerce is extensive 
both in terms reach and magnitude. For example as of end of 2001, government 
linked institutions as a group own about 37% of the shares in listed companies.(13) 
Companies controlled by the state-linked institutions are some of the largest in 
terms of capitalization in the KLSE. 
Thus, ownership patterns point towards concentrated ownership by family 
groups and also a strong presence of state and state-linked ownership in 
Malaysia. In these circumstances, large owners have significant influence on 
management or even may be part of management, so that the classical separation 
of owners and management is blurred. From an agency perspective, would 
large shareholders with strong influence on management make decisions in 
the best interest of all shareholders? With the presence of large shareholders, 
corporate governance is then concerned with protecting the interest of minority 
shareholders against managers and controlling owners/shareholders. 
Given these differences, we explore the relationship between ownership and 
board characteristics (corporate governance) in a sample of companies listed on 
the Malaysian stock exchange. Board characteristics are internally determined in 
the company and the choice reflects the wishes of the management/controlling 
shareholders. These choices of governance attributes are likely to further the 
interest of management/controlling shareholders rather than diluting it. The 
influence of management/controlling shareholders has major implications on 
corporate governance practice in the firm. 
 
3. Study significance and rational 
Macro-level studies have investigated legal protections accorded to 
investors and how they have affected the development of capital markets around 
the world.(14) Many other studies have linked corporate governance structures 
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and board composition with company performance.(15) , (16) Countries with better 
corporate governance standards have better developed capital markets.(17) At 
the firm level, strategy-consulting firm McKinsey & Co. found that investors 
are willing to pay a premium of up to 30% for firms with good corporate 
governance.(18)
Given the significant concentrated shareholdings by families and the state 
in Malaysia, it is likely that the governance structures in such companies would 
ensure that the influence of these major shareholders are not compromised.  
This study is an attempt to contribute to research on the relationship 
between ownership characteristics and corporate governance structures in 
Malaysia. The rich interplay of ownership and governance structures in the 
context of concentrated ownership, government-linked and foreign ownership 
adds to the literature that examines ownership and governance structures. In 
addition, it also provides insights that could help policy makers and regulators 
to enhance governance mechanisms and understand the dynamics of ownership 
characteristics.  
  
II.  Research Hypothesis, Model and Methodology 
The research model encompasses two major elements: ownership and 
corporate governance. The relationship between these two elements is the focus 
of the study. 
Large owners by virtue of their voting power are represented in the Board 
of Directors (BOD). With Board positions, they can influence business strategies 
and company operations. When large owners are also founding owners or 
members of founding families, they may also constitute part of the management 
team. Thus, the influence of large owners goes far beyond mere ownership of 
shares and has a real influence on every aspect of company management and 
corporate governance. Therefore,  owners with large stakes are likely to have 
board structures that seek to preserve their influence. Since there are large family, 
foreign and state ownership, there could be potential conflict in the objectives of 
these different owners. These differences may influence in the manner internal 
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corporate governance structures are arrived at in a firm. 
The theoretical and conventional wisdom favored by policy makers to have 
independent directors and to require separating the Board chairman and the chief 
executive officer is tested whether in the presence of large family, foreign and 
state share holding makes a difference in the way Boards are structured.   
The relationship between governance and ownership variables were tested 
with a generic regression model in the form given below. 
Governance = f ( ownership, control variables, ε i )
where ε i is the error term and control variables are company size, age 
of company and industry categories. 
1. Share Ownership
Ownership comes with the right to vote and hence the ability to influence 
company policy through the appointment of members of the Board of Directors. 
Large shareholding provides the incentive for owners to use their influence to 
maximize value, exert control and to protect their interest in the company. It 
is well known that control rights attached to holding a large block of shares 
attract a premium. This premium is usually associated with private benefits of 
control, which is the ability to extract rents at the expense of other shareholders. 
Concentrated shareholding as a corporate structure is considered to be a 
response for poor shareholder and investor protection. Where the law is weak 
or enforcement of investor protection is weak, the natural reaction is to seek a 
form of corporate structure that enables the shareholder to protect his interest. 
Concentrated shareholding provides that protection. 
2. Corporate Governance Structures
(a) Board Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
Internal corporate governance mechanisms are designed to ensure that that 
there are enough checks and balances to ensure that decision-making leads to 
shareholder value maximization. It includes having a separate Board chairman 
and CEO and a larger fraction of independent directors and proper functioning 
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of Board committees (audit, remuneration, nomination). 
Combining both roles in one-person tantamounts to allowing the CEO to 
evaluate his own performance and undermines the oversight function of the 
board with the Chairman as its head. With a separate Chairman and CEO, the 
Board acting collectively can remove the CEO and senior management for non-
performance. Combining the roles in one individual concentrates power and 
creates conflict of interest. The separation of the Board Chairman and the CEO 
reduces the possibility of self-dealing by members of the management team.(19) 
With separation of the Board chairman and the CEO, it is likely that these value 
decreasing transactions would be more closely scrutinized to ensure that they 
are above-board and the interest of all shareholders is protected. Where a listed 
company is still managed by its founder, it is likely to find him holding the 
position of the executive chairman combining board and management position. 
Among family controlled businesses it is also common to have the patriarch 
taking on Board chairmanship, while members of his family hold executive 
positions. Thus, while there may be nominal separation of the two positions, 
functionally they act as one. 
Minority shareholders can, in theory, propose their own candidates. 
However, free-rider problems, cost of aggregating minority votes and the ease in 
which majority shareholders can out vote the minority shareholders make such 
a move impractical.  Therefore, even though shareholders have the right to elect 
Board members, this right is often illusory.(20) Ineffective boards have been cited 
as the reason for loss of competitiveness when they fail to respond to changes 
in the product market, technology and organizational innovations and global 
competition for products and services.(21)  
 (b) Independent Directors
Independent directors on company Boards are believed to be an integral 
component of  internal control and monitoring mechanism. Independent 
directors are required as members of the Audit, Remuneration, and Nomination 
committees. In theory, independent directors do not represent any major 
shareholder group or have any relationship with management or the company. 
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Truly independent directors have the potential to play a crucial role in 
monitoring management performance and maintain overall Board impartiality in 
evaluating company strategies and performance.  Conventional wisdom is that 
independent directors will bring about a more proactive and assertive voice to 
the Board. These two beliefs probably form the basis for the suggestion by many 
think-tanks and codes of corporate governance around the world to increase the 
number of independent Board members.   
(c) Control Variables
Past studies have used total assets as a control variable for size. These 
include studies by Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (22) and Agrawal and 
Knoeber(23) and Booth et al.(24) In keeping with past research, total assets as a 
proxy for size are used. It is also well known that companies in different industry 
sectors have different risk and return profiles. Most studies define industries by 
using various levels of industry classification numbers. Industry differences are 
controlled using industry categorization provided by the KLSE. In addition, the 
age of the company may also have an impact on the distribution of shareholding. 
Older companies, having gone through many business cycles, may have a wider 
shareholder distribution. We use the age of incorporation as a proxy for company 
age rather than the year of listing.  
III. Methodology
1. Measurement of Ownership
Public listed companies are required to publish an analysis of the top 30 
shareholders and the share distribution in their annual reports.(25) As a result, 
it is possible to have better information on the ownership structure of public 
listed companies. Wherever possible, direct ownership of shares by individuals 
is identified. This is supplemented with information on indirect ownership 
held through nominee companies and other corporate holdings, and trust is 
added to obtain the percentage share held by the five largest shareholders. 
Ownership by the state is obtained by adding all shares held by government trust 
agencies, federal and state government investment arms, state trust agencies and 
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federal pension funds. Foreign ownership levels were obtained from Investors 
Digest, which publishes foreign shareholdings in all public listed companies 
in Malaysia.(26) Three ownership measures were calculated. These are: the 
percentage held by the largest shareholder; total shares held by the largest 5 
shareholders; Hirch Herfindhal Index (HHI) measure.
2. Governance Measures
Two internal governance control measures are used. They are Board 
independence and the separation of CEO and the Board Chairman. Independent 
directors are identified as such in the annual reports. Independent directors are 
measured as absolute numbers in the first instance and also as a ratio to the 
Board size. The separation of the Board Chairman and the CEO is measured as 
a dummy variable. If there is a separation, the variable takes the value of 1 and 
0 otherwise. Where the Board chairman and the CEO are closely related, the 
company is coded as having a unified CEO and Board Chairman. 
3. Data Collection
Two samples were assembled. The first sample was for the year 1996. This 
sample would reflect the relatively buoyant economy prior to the financial crisis 
in late 1997. The second sample was collected for the year 2001. During these 
intervening years, many companies were restructured, and rules and regulations 
in relation to corporate governance were adopted by the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange. The sample for 2001 would reflect the performance of the companies 
after restructuring and reorganization and implementation of some of the 
corporate governance measures. 
4. Descriptive Statistics
In 1996, the mean holding by the largest shareholder was 32.1 percent, mean 
shareholding by foreigners 15.92 percent and state-linked shareholding was 
20.26. Mean Board size was 7.45 and mean number of independent directors 
was 2.35 (table 1-Panel A). In 2001, the mean shareholding by the largest 
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shareholder, government and foreign shareholding was 37.57 percent, 9.86 
percent and 12.67 percent respectively. Mean board size was 7.62 and the mean 
number of independent directors was 2.56.(table1- Panel B) 
The holding by the top shareholder had significantly increased between the 
intervening years. This could be a result of actual increases in the holding by 
the top shareholder, or could also be a result  of regulations introduced in 2000 
requiring shareholders to reveal their direct and indirect shareholding held via 
holding, nominee or other means. The percentage held by the top 5 shareholders 
and likewise the concentration ratio also show a significant increase, probably 
for similar reasons. Foreign shareholding had significantly decreased during the 
period. The reduced holding suggests foreign shareholders may have liquidated 
their holdings during the crisis and had not made a significant return to the 
market.(27) State-linked shareholding does not show any significant shareholding 
differences. 
In as far as the ownership variables are concerned, it appears that financial 
theory correctly predicts the behaviors of various classes of shareholders. 
Foreign shareholders holding relatively smaller holdings are rather flexible 
in their holding pattern and exit the market relatively easily. However, block 
holders (top shareholders) and stake-linked entities were probably not in a 
position to exit the market and were left holding significant holdings in a 
declining market. 
On governance variables, Board size had reduced though not very 
significantly. However, the mean number of independent directors had increased 
significantly. The increase in the mean size of the number of independent 
directors may be attributed to the recommendations of the Malaysian Code 
of Corporate Governance, that at least one third of the directors should be 
independent directors. An alternative explanation is that loss making companies 
are more likely to appoint more independent directors as part of the restructuring 
that was still ongoing in the year 2001. In tandem with the increase in the 
number of independent directors and the reduction in board size, the ratio of 
independent directors also shows a significant increase. In 1996, 30.96 % of the 
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companies in the sample had separate Board Chairman and the Chief Executive 
Officer. This increased to 37.01% in 2001 indicating increasing adherence to 
the guidelines of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance that advocates a 
separation between these two positions.  
IV. Empirical Findings
The separation between the Board Chairman and the CEO is a binary 
variable taking the value of 1 if it is split and 0 otherwise. We use a binary 
logistics regression model to capture the relationship between Chairman/CEO 
duality and performance and ownership attributes. We test the relationship 
between ownership and log odds that the post of the Chairman and CEO will be 
split using logistic regression model. The results are presented in Table2 –Panel 
A and B. The presentation and interpretation of relevant statistics for a binary 
logistics regression follows the suggestion by Brace et al.(28)
The full model using 1997 data is not reliable which suggest that the 
ownership types cannot adequately predict likelihood of having a split Board 
chairman and CEO. Consistent with the lack of model fit, the summary statistics 
obtained from the binary logistics regression explains a low percentage variance 
in the likelihood of the incidence of  Chairman/CEO duality as given by the Cox 
and Snell and Nagelkerke R2 values (5.8 percent and 8.1 percent respectively) 
in (table 2- Panel A ). The regression coefficients of ownership were also not 
significant. In other words, knowing the ownership attributes it is not possible 
to say one way or another whether there will be a separation in the Board 
chairmanship and the CEO. 
Similar binary logistics regression was performed using the data from the 
2001 sample. The results are presented in table 2-Panel B. The results show that 
the binary logistics regression using 2001 data is again not significant (p=0.0128) 
and that the model explains 3.5 to 4.8 percent of the variation in the dependent 
variable. (Cox & Snell and Nagelkerke R2 are 0.035 and 0.048 respectively). 
Though the model as a whole is not significant, the coefficient of state-linked 
ownership ( β = 0.019) is significantly ( p= 0.001) associated with the likelihood 
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of having Chairman/CEO separation. An increase in 1 percent by stake-linked 
ownership increases the odds of having duality by a factor of 1.02 given by the 
factor Exp (B) column. This relationship is easily explained by the fact that 
where government ownership is large enough to appoint Board members, it is 
more likely to have a separation between the Chairman and CEO. 
We continue to test the relationship between governance and ownership. In 
this series, the ratio of independent directors and Board size as the dependent 
variable. Table 3 and table 4 present the regression estimates.  The Table 5 
shows that there is no significant relationship between the ratio of independent 
Board directors and the ownership characteristics. All the β  coefficients of 
ownership variables are not statistically significant. We offer a tentative 
explanation. At whatever level of ownership or type of ownership, the ratio of 
independent directors is invariant. This could be due to a standing rule of the 
KLSE that at least one third of the Board members should be independent. Most 
of the companies comply with this requirement as shown by the mean ratio of 
independent directors which was 0.31 in 1996 and 0.36 in 2001. As a result of 
this regulatory requirement it is not possible to observe significant relationship 
between the ratio of independent directors and ownership type. An extension 
of this explanation implies whoever is in control of the corporation is only 
interested in complying with the minimum requirements of the rules. Corporate 
governance rules become an exercise in ticking the correct boxes to show 
compliance with the rules. 
The relationship between Board size and ownership was tested using OLS 
regression equation. The results of the regression are presented in Table 4. 
The regressions estimates do not indicate any significant relationship 
between ownership variables and Board size in 1996 once the control variables 
are added. However, by 2001, Board size is positively related to state and foreign 
ownership. Only foreign and government-linked ownership have a positive 
relationship with Board size in 2001 but not in 1996. This could be due to the 
poor performance of companies and hence, additional directors were appointed 
to help in the recovery process. The relationship between foreign shareholding 
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and government-linked shareholding with board size can also be explained 
by the fact that they largely invest in bigger companies. And since there is a 
correlation between large companies and Board size, we may be observing a 
relationship arising from company size. This explanation is probable because the 
coefficient of the size control variable is significant (t = 6.006 in 1996 and t = 5.39 
in 2001). 
V. Discussions
The analysis  above indicate the following general relationships. The 
average holding by the largest shareholder was 32.1 per cent in 1996 and 37.6 
per cent in 2001. Consistent with the findings of Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 
we found that 62 percent of the companies in our sample for 1996 and 76 
percent of the companies in 2001 have controlling shareholders with over 25 per 
cent holdings.(29) By 2001 there was significant increase in mean concentration 
measures. Probably large shareholders were unable to dispose of their holdings 
or picked up undervalued shares in a declining market. Foreign shareholding 
reduced after the crisis, indicating foreign confidence in the KLSE equity market 
had not recovered. 
The number of independent directors increased significantly between 1997 
and 2001. The proportion of Boards having separate Chairman and CEO also 
increased during the same period. Board size decreased during the period. It is 
probable that the appointment of independent directors (at minimum two or one-
third of the board size) and the decision to separate the Chairman and CEO are 
made in compliance with rules imposed by regulators. 
The data from 1997 indicates that the type of ownership shows no significant 
relationship to the likelihood of having a board duality. However, by the year 
2001 the coefficient of state ownership is significantly associated with the 
likelihood of having board duality. This indicates that where the state’s holding 
is large enough, it is more likely to have a separation between the Chairman 
and CEO. It is also an indication that the state has responded positively to the 
recommendations of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance to have a 
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separate Board Chairman and CEO and also project an image of accountability 
that the state is committed to promote.   In addition there is also some evidence 
that state ownership is linked with larger Board size.
It is clear that there is a higher number of independent directors and there is 
a tendency to separate the Board Chairman and the CEO especially in companies 
where there is a high level of state ownership.  It could be expected in time to 
come compliance of these two measures will be very high. Companies are more 
likely to comply than to explain non-compliance in the annual report.  
Regulators could derive satisfaction from a  high level of compliance. 
However, it will auger well for regulators to dwell into the quality and 
actual workings of the Board Chairman and the independent directors.  The 
appointments of independent directors is sometimes perceived to be made to 
enhance company prestige by having high profile politicians and ex-bureaucrats 
on the Board. Since the appointments of independent directors and Board 
Chairman are largely internal decisions made by those who control the company, 
it is unlikely that the controlling shareholder makes these appointments with the 
expectation that they would actually act “independently.” As a result independent 
directors and the separation of the CEO and Board Chairman may have little 
influence in the operations of the company. The implication is that controlling 
owners strategically placed in management or the Board, drive decision-making. 
Governance structures such as the separation of the Board Chairman and CEO 
and the presence of independent Board members, while theoretically neat 
and elegant, can be manipulated in the interest of the controlling shareholder. 
Our tentative assertion is that in an environment where there is concentrated 
ownership, corporate governance is subsumed to the will of the largest owner. 
Corporate governance mechanism would then be instruments that do the bidding 
of the controlling owners.   
   
VI. Conclusion
What are the policy implications of these findings? It is clear that knowing 
the ownership characteristics generally does not give any clue as to how the 
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internal governance structures may be arranged in a company except that is 
some evidence that state-linked companies are more likely to have a separation 
between the board chairman and the CEO. Nevertheless, there is a clear trend 
is for companies to comply with regulatory requirements on the number of 
independent directors and the separation of Board Chairman and the CEO. 
However, what does higher compliance mean to an average shareholder? In 
keeping with the mandate of corporate governance rationale, it should lead to 
increasing shareholder value. Therefore, these internal governance structures need 
to be more meaningful and not merely compliance bound box-ticking exercises. 
More thought and effort should be placed on the actual workings of the Board. It 
has to start with an active search for Board members with the required expertise- 
an exercise that mirrors the search for CEOs; an incentive system that is geared 
towards obtaining commitment to add shareholder value; and internal procedures 
that allows free flow of information from and to management. It is the individual 
Board members working collectively with adequate oversight  that can drive 
management towards increasing shareholder value. 
* I am indebted to and thank the following for their encouragement and guidance 
in the course of developing the concept and research on corporate governance: 
Professors Nobuya Takezawa, Kano Yamamoto, Norihiko Suzuki, Temario 
Rivera and Noaya Takezawa. This paper forms part of my PhD dissertation.
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Table 2  Panel A (96)  -Binary Logistic Regression Estimates with Chair-
man/CEO Duality as Dependent Variable and Ownership as Indepen-
dent Variable
Model Summary
Panel B (01)- Binary Logistics Regression Estimates with Chair-
man/CEO Duality as Dependent Variable and Ownership As Indepen-
dent Variable, 2001
Model Summary
% holding largest S/H
% Foreign
% State
Ln Total Assets
Ln Age 
Constant
% holding largest S/H
% Foreign
% State
Ln Total Assets
Ln Age 
Constant
% holding by largest Shareholder 
% held by foreigners 
% held by state-linked entities 
% shareholding by top 5 shareholders 
Concentration Ratio (HHI) 
Board Size 
No. of  Independent Directors 
Ratio of Independent Directors 
Total Assets 
Total Sales 
Total Liabilities 
Age of Companies 
Valid N (listwise)
447
436
166
447
447
415
410
410
503
502
442
498
144
4.14
0.03
1.31
18.93
0.01
2.00
1.00
0.11
4.07
0.01
0.21
1.00
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Table 1   Overall Descriptive Statistics (Panel A ’96)
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Variables in the binary logistics equation
Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square-2 log likelihood
-0.047
0.055
0.019
0.200
0.011
-0.1769
0.006
0.005
0.059
0.116
0.073
0.463
0.685
1.294
10.79
2.971
0.023
0.146
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.408
0.255
0.001
0.085
0.879
0.7024
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Variables in the binary logistics equation
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Table 2  Panel A (96)  -Binary Logistic Regression Estimates with Chair-
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dent Variable
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Table 3  Regression Estimates with Board independence as the dependent vari-
able –1996 and 2001 
Ratio of Independent directors as dependent variable
Table 4  Regression Estimates with Board size as dependent variable –1996 and 
2001 
Board size as dependent variable
Constant
% largest Shareholder
% Foreigner
% State
Ln of Total Assets
Ln age
R2adjusted
F-value
Obs
0.302
(15.76)***
-0.00033
(-0.65)
0.00046
(1.3)
0.00038
(0.96)
-0.005
0.733
148
0.346
(9.69)***
-0.00018
(-0.372)
0.00074
(1.96)**
0.00041
(0.976)
-0.0021
(-3.583)***
0.00223
(2.647)***
0.113
2.35**
148
0.347
(37.97)***
0.000041
(0.018)
-0.00013
(-0.724)
-0.00017
(-0.889)
-0.03
0.431
583
0.330
(17.27)***
0.000234
(-0.1)
0.000209
(-1.08)
0.000228
(-1.11)
0.00113
(-0.368)
0.00882
(1.79)*
-0.007
0.721
582
1996
Without
control
variables
With 
Control
Variables
2001
Without
control
variables
With 
Control
Variables
(***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1)
(t-statistics are reported in parenthesis, beneath the parameter estimates)
Constant
% largest Shareholder
% Foreigner
% State
Ln of Total Assets
Ln age
R2 adjusted
F-value
Obs
7.36
(16.77)***
-0.00253
(-0.216)
0.0195
(2.42)**
0.0125
(1.35)
0.027
2.34**
148
4.69
(5.99)***
-0.00032
(-0.029)
0.0083
(1.008)
0.0018
(0.195)
0.744
(6.006)***
-0.359
(1.94)**
0.218
3.4***
148
7.12
(34.9)***
0.00278
(0.556)
0.0183
(4.434)***
0.0176
(4.12)***
0.056
12.53***
588
5.90
(14.16)
-0.00097
(-0.192)
0.01562
(3.702)***
0.0133
(3.017)***
0.357
(5.39)***
-0.209
(0.052)**
0.103
5.792***
587
1996
Without
control
variables
With 
Control
Variables
2001
Without
control
variables
With 
Control
Variables
(***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1)
(t-statistics are reported in parenthesis, beneath the parameter estimates)
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エージェンシー論と企業統治において、企業最高責任者と代表取締役を分離するこ
と及び社外取締役の数を増やすことを推奨している。本研究では、こうした企業統治
構造が企業所有者によって、違った傾向が存在するかどうかについて検証を行った。
クアラルンプール証券取引所の二つのデータセットを検証した結果、企業最高責任者
と代表取締役を分離させること及び社外取締役の数を増加させることによって、法的
規制をより遵守する傾向があることを発見した。また、公的企業の方がより多くの取
締役を持つとともに、企業最高責任者と代表取締役の役割を分離する傾向が見られた。
企業所有は私たちに統治構造の何を語りかけるのか？
＜　要　約　＞
スンダラン・アナマライ
